

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 0240

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, UR

SUBJECT: BILATERAL TECHNICAL PNE CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR

REF: A. MOSCOW 0150 B. STATE 0847

1. SUMMARY. DURING MY CALL ON MOROKHOV ON JANUARY 6, HE AGREED THAT BILATERAL PNE TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS COULD BEGIN IN VIENNA JANUARY 15 (REPORTED REF A). HE VOICED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF SUCH CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEFOREHAND TO DISCUSS SAFETY STANDARDS, ESPECIALLY RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A PREPARED STATEMENT EXPLAINING WHY THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES CONSULTATIONS, MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR STANDS ON SAFETY STANDARDS IN ORDER TO ENABLE IAEA TO DETERMINE ITS POLICY ON THESE QUESTIONS. WITHOUT SUCH CONSULTATIONS, HE SAID, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES.

3. HE THEN EMBARKED ON A LENGTHY DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY OF OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON SAFETY STANDARDS, POINTING OUT THAT AT THE THIRD STAGE BILATERAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN 1971, A PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE WAS AGREED TO WHICH ESTABLISHED RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS. THESE STANDARDS, HE CONTINUED, PROHIBITED PNE'S WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ANY INCREASE OF GLOBAL RADIOACTIVITY LEVELS EXCEEDING BY MORE THAN TEN PERCENT THE NORMS LAID DOWN BY THE  
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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON RADIOACTIVITY PROTECTION. AT THE SAME

TIME, WORLD "BACKGROUND" LEVELS (STRONTIUM 90, PLUTONIUM 237)  
SHOULD CONTINUE TO DECREASE.

4. THE QUESTION THE USSR AND THE U.S. FACE, MOROKHOV CONTINUED, IS HOW TO TURN OUR NPT ARTICLE V OBLIGATIONS INTO CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS SHOULD BE OUR GOAL IN THESE CONSULTATIONS. WITHOUT A READINESS TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS, "THERE IS NO USE HAVING CONSULTATIONS."

5. I THEN INFORMED MOROKHOV WHAT WE BELIEVED COULD BE USEFULLY ACHIEVED IN THESE CONSULTATIONS, DRAWING FROM INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF B. AFTER I HAD FINISHED MY STATEMENT, HE REMARKED THAT HE "MUST HAVE BEEN NAIVE," FOR HE HAD HOPED FOR A DISCUSSION ON STANDARDS. IN YEARS PAST, HE CONTINUED, IT HAD BEEN THE U.S. WHICH CONSTANTLY BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF SAFETY STANDARDS; IN THOSE DAYS THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT YET READY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION. BY 1971, HOWEVER, WHEN THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE ITS OWN INTERNAL DECISIONS AND WAS PREPARED FOR DISCUSSIONS, THE UNITED STATES SUDDENLY LOST INTEREST. HE REMARKED THAT AMBASSADOR TAPE HAD DISPLAYED SOME INTEREST IN THE QUESTION LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, AND IT WAS AGREED TO CONSULT ON THE ISSUE NOVEMBER 1974.

5. HE CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME TO SET UP QUALITATIVE STANDARDS. SUCH STANDARDS WOULD BE DESCRIPTIVE ONLY AND CONTAIN NO QUANTITATIVE PARAMETERS. THEY COULD BE FORWARDED TO THE AGENCY IN THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. ROLAND TIMERBAYEV, WHO WAS SITTING IN ON THE MEETING WITH MOROKHOV, INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAD, AT THE DIRECTION OF THE 29TH UNGA, ASKED IAEA TO WORK ON THE QUESTION OF RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS.

6. MOROKHOV ARGUED FURTHER THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE CONSULTATIONS WAS NOT A CORRECT ONE; IN HIS WORDS, IT REPRESENTED A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE SOLUTION, NOT TOWARD IT. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY WE SAW IN ATTEMPTING TO DIVORCE THE QUESTION OF RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS FROM POLICY QUESTIONS ON THE LTBT. MOROKHOV EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS PROBLEM, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE NPT'S CONTINUE TO BE "LEGAL," AND THAT THE NPT HAD NOT ONLY GIVEN ITS ASSENT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, CONFIDENTIAL

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BUT ALSO, ONE COULD SAY, RECOMMENDED THEIR USE. A QUESTION DOES REMAIN, HE CONCEDED, ON HOW ONE MAKES COMPATIBLE THE POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED WITH THE TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL.

7. MOROKHOV CONTENDED THAT THE ALREADY EXISTING DOCUMENT ON RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE HELD AS A BILATERAL DOCUMENT, BUT SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OTHER NATIONS AS WELL. (I DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS IMPLYING THAT

THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION IN THIS REGARD.)  
THE AGENCY SHOULD RECOMMEND USE OF THESE CRITERIA TO ITS MEMBER STATES, AND SHOULD ALSO RECOMMEND OTHER SAFETY STANDARDS AS WELL. HE AGAIN REITERATED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE NPT DOES NOT STOP THE USE OF PNE'S AND POINTED OUT THAT WITHIN THE RADIOACTIVITY STANDARDS AGREED TO IN 1971 BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, A NATION SUCH AS CANADA COULD EXPLODE 30 NUCLEAR DEVICES A YEAR FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

8. TIMERBAYEV AT THIS POINT ADMITTED THAT WE HAD RAISED A JUSTIFIABLE QUESTION RELATING TO NEGOTIATING TACTICS (LAST LINE OF PARA 3, REFTTEL). IN HIS OPINION, HOWEVER, IT WAS A PROBLEM EASILY SOLVED. BOTH HE AND MOROKHOV ADVOCATED HAVING A SMALLER, "DISINTERESTED" NATION SUCH AS THAILAND, FOR WHOM USE OF PNE'S TO BUILD THE KRA CANAL HAD BEEN ATTRACTIVE, PROPOSE, "WITH OUR HELP", CRITERIA UPON WHICH WE WOULD HAVE AGREED BEFOREHAND.

9. MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAYEV AT THIS POINT SEEMINGLY HAVING FINISHED THEIR ARGUMENTS, I ASKED THEM FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 15, DESPITE THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE AGENDA WE HAD PROPOSED. THEY CONFIRMED THAT IT WOULD.

10. MOROKHOV ASKED, IN PASSING, IF WE HAD ANY FURTHER WORD ON THE NUCLEAR EXPORTERS CONFERENCE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD RECEIVED NOTHING NEW; I UNDERSTOOD WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH AND WERE AWAITING THEIR DEFINITIVE POSITION. I PROMISED TO INFORM HIM AS SOON AS WE HAD ANYTHING.  
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